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Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic
threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist
“quantum attacks”. In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of
quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often
not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which
are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the
first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and
evaluate the security of previously-proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these
works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed
protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue
that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing
cryptographic literature.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Voting is fundamental in democratic societies. With the technological advances of the computer
era, voting could benefit to become more secure and efficient and as a result more democratic.
For this reason, over the last two decades, several cryptographic protocols for electronic voting
were proposed and implemented, see e.g. [1, 11, 16, 28, 31, 44]. The security of all these systems
relies on computational assumptions such as the hardness of integer factorization and the discrete
logarithm problem. But, these are easy to solve with quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm [45].
Although not yet available, recent technological advances indicate that quantum computers will
soon be threatening existing cryptographic protocols. In this context, researchers have proposed to
use quantum communication to implement primitives like key distribution, bit commitment and
oblivious transfer. Unfortunately, perfect security without assumptions has proven to be challenging
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Privacy Correctness Verifiability Corruption
Dual basis (Section 4) ✕ ? ? 𝜖 fraction of voters
Travelling ballot (Section 5) ✕ ✕ ✕ two voters
Distributed ballot (Section 6) ? ✕∗ ✕ 𝜖 fraction of voters
Conjugate coding (Section 7) ✕ ? ? election authority
Table 1. Properties of the different categories of quantum e-voting protocols. ✕: Insecure, ?: Unexplored Area,
∗:Protocol runs less than 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )) rounds.
in the quantum setting [34, 36], and the need to study different corruption models has emerged.
This includes limiting the number of dishonest parties and introducing different non-colluding
authorities.
More than a decade of studies on quantum electronic voting has resulted in several protocols
that use the properties of quantum mechanical systems. However, all these new protocols are
studied against different and not well-articulated corruption models, and claim security using
ad-hoc proofs that are not formalized and backed only against limited classes of quantum attacks. In
particular, none of the proposed schemes provides rigorous definitions of privacy and verifiability,
nor formal security proofs against specific, well-defined (quantum) attacker models. When it comes
to electronic voting schemes, it is particularly hard to ensure that all the, somehow conflicting,
properties hold [12]; it is therefore important that these new quantum protocols be rigorously and
mathematically studied and the necessary assumptions and limitations formally established.
This is precisely what we set to address in this paper. We first give formal definitions for
verifiability and vote privacy in the quantum setting considering adaptive corruption. Subsequently,
we systematize and assess the security of existing e-voting protocols based on quantum technology.
We specifically examine the claims of each of these solutions concerning the above-mentioned
well-defined properties. Unfortunately our analyses uncover vulnerabilities in all the proposed
schemes. While some of them suffer from trivial attacks due to inconsistencies in the security
definitions, the main contribution of the paper is to argue that sophisticated attacks can exist even
in protocols that “seem secure” if the security is proven ad hoc, and not in a formal framework. We
argue that the cause of these failures is the absence of an appropriate security framework in which
to establish formal security proofs, which we have now introduced.
Therefore, this paper follows previous works [4, 22, 38, 43, 48] in their effort to highlight the
importance of formally defining and proving security in the relatively new field of quantum
cryptography. This also includes studying classical protocols that are secure against unbounded
attackers [8], as well as ones based on problems believed to be hard even for quantum computers
e.g. lattice-based [13]. However, it is out of the scope of this study to review such classical protocols,
as we are focusing on the possible contribution of quantum computers to the security of e-voting.
Contributions: We propose the first formal definitions for vote privacy and universal verifiability
in the quantum setting considering adaptive corruption, and show that none of the proposed
quantum protocols so far satisfy them. To this end, we systematize the proposed quantum e-voting
approaches according to key technical features. To our knowledge, our study covers all relevant
research in the field, identifying four main families. Table 1 summarises our results.
• Two measurement bases protocols - These protocols rely on two measurement bases to verify
the correct distribution of an entangled state. We specifically prove that the probability that
a number of corrupted states are not tested and used later in the protocol, is non-negligible,
which leads to a violation of voters’ privacy. Furthermore, even if the states are shared by a
trusted authority, we show that privacy can still be violated in case of abort.
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• Traveling ballot protocols - In these protocols the “ballot box” circulates among all voters who
add their vote by applying a unitary to it. We show how colluding voters can break honest
voters’ vote privacy just by measuring the ballot box before and after the victim has cast their
ballot. These protocols further suffer as we will see from double voting attacks, whereby a
dishonest voter can simply apply multiple time the voting operator.
• Distributed ballot protocols - These schemes exploit properties of entangled states that allow
voters to cast their votes by applying operations on parts of them. We present an attack
that allows the adversary to double-vote and therefore change the outcome of the voting
process with probability at least 0.25, if the protocol runs fewer than exponentially many
rounds in the number of voters. The intuition behind this attack is that an adversary does not
need to find exactly how the ballots have been created in order to influence the outcome of
the election; it suffices to find a specific relation between them from left-over voting ballots
provided by the corrupted voters.
• Conjugate coding protocols - These protocols exploit BB84 states adding some verification
mechanism. The main issue with these schemes, as we show, is that ballots are malleable,
allowing an attacker to modify the part of the ballot which encodes the candidate choice to
their advantage.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We use the term quantum bit or qubit [39] to denote the simplest quantum mechanical object we
will use. We say that a qubit is in a pure state if it can be expressed as a linear combination of other
pure states:










where |𝛼 |2 + |𝛽 |2 = 1 for any 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ C. The states |0⟩ and |1⟩ are called the computational basis
vectors. Sometimes it is also helpful to think of a qubit as a vector in the two-dimensional Hilbert
space H . If a qubit cannot be written in the above form, then we say it is in a mixed state. The




𝑎 𝑗 | 𝑗⟩ , where
𝑚−1∑︁
𝑗=0
|𝑎 𝑗 |2 = 1








|𝛼𝑖 𝑗 |2 = 1. If the total state vector |𝜓 ⟩ cannot be written as a tensor product of two
qubits (i.e. |𝑥1⟩ ⊗ |𝑥2⟩), then we say that qubits |𝑥1⟩ and |𝑥2⟩ are entangled. An example of two-qubit
entangled states, are the four Bell states, which form a basis of the two-dimensional Hilbert space:
|Φ±⟩ = 1√
2
( |00⟩ ± |11⟩), |Ψ±⟩ = 1√
2
( |01⟩ ± |10⟩)
A quantum system that is in one of the above states is also called an EPR pair [21]. The way
we obtain information about a quantum system is by performing a measurement using a family
of linear operators {𝑀 𝑗 } acting on the state space of the system, where 𝑗 denotes the different
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is the conjugate transpose of matrix𝑀 𝑗 , and I the identity operator. For qudit |𝑦⟩, the
probability that the measurement outcome is𝑤 is: Pr(𝑤) = ⟨𝑦 |𝑀†𝑤𝑀𝑤 |𝑦⟩ and in the continuous





𝑀 𝑗 |𝑦⟩ 𝑑 𝑗 .
For a single qubit |𝑥⟩ = 𝛼 |0⟩ + 𝛽 |1⟩, measurement in the computational basis will give outcome
zero with probability |𝛼 |2 and outcome one with probability |𝛽 |2. If our state is entangled, a partial
measurement (i.e. a measurement in one of the entangled qudits), not only reveals information
about the measured qudit, but possibly about the remaining state. For example, let us recall the
Bell state |Φ+⟩. A measurement of the first qubit in the computational basis will give outcome 0 or
1 with equal probability and the remaining qubit will collapse to the state |0⟩ or |1⟩ respectively.
In quantum cryptography, the correlations in the measurement outcomes of entangled states
are frequently exploited. Another entangled state of interest used in Section 4, gives measurement
outcomes that sum up to zero when measured in the computational basis, and equal outcomes when










|000⟩ + |011⟩ + |101⟩ + |110⟩
)
Finally, the evolution of a closed quantum system can be described by the application of a unitary
operator. Unitary operators are reversible and preserve the inner product. Recall our first example,
and let’s say we would like to swap the amplitudes on state |𝑥⟩, then we can apply the operator 𝑋
(known as NOT-gate):





The 𝑋 -gate is one of the Pauli operators, which together with 𝑍 and 𝑌 , as well as the identity
operator I, form a basis for the vector space of 2 × 2 Hermitian matrices. These operators are
unitaries, and as such preserve the inner product.
A very important difference between quantum and classical information, is that there is no
mechanism to create a copy of an unknown quantum state [39]. This result, known as the no-
cloning theorem, is one of the fundamental advantages and at the same time limitations of quantum
information. It becomes extremely relevant for cryptography, since brute-force types of attacks
cannot be applied on quantum channels that carry unknown information. When verifying quantum
resources however, it is necessary to apply a cut-and-choose technique in order to test that the
received quantum states are correctly produced. The quantum source would therefore need to send
exponentially many copies of the quantum state [29], in order for the verifier to measure most of
them and deduce that with high probability, the remaining ones are correct.
3 DEFINITIONS OF SECURE QUANTUM ELECTRONIC VOTING
Electronic voting protocols are multiparty protocols typically involving talliers, voters and bulletin
boards [1, 28, 31]. In this work, we will be dealing with protocols involving one election authority
𝐸𝐴, a set of votersV = {𝑉𝑘 }𝑁𝑘=1 and a set of talliers 𝑇 (which may overlap withV). 𝐸𝐴 sets the
parameters of the protocol, each voter 𝑉𝑘 ∈ V casts vote 𝑣𝑘 and 𝑇 gathers the ballots, computes
the election outcome and announces it. A voting protocol Π has three distinct phases (setup,
casting, and tally) and running time that is polynomial to the security parameter 𝛿0. It specifies
three algorithms {CastBallot, Tally,Verify}, the setup procedure and the communication channels
ACM Trans. Quantum Comput., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
Definitions and Security of Quantum Electronic Voting 111:5
between participants (which is captured in our formal definition with the communication oracle
O). For formalising security we adopt the standard game-based security framework. The security
of a protocol is captured by a game between a challenger C that models the honest parties, and
a quantum polynomial-time adversary A that captures the corrupted parties. A can adaptively
corrupt a fraction 𝜖 of the voters. We assume that the eligibility list is provided a priori in a trusted
manner and that A chooses the votes of all voters, in order to provide stronger definitions [28].
We denote with X𝑎 the local register of each party 𝑎. Communication between parties is done
using communication oracles [20]; a call to the oracle OΠ,A (X𝑆 ,X𝑅) takes contents of the sender’s
register X𝑆 and copies them to the receiver’s register X𝑅 , according to Π. In between, it allows
the communication to be processed by A, and it also erases the quantum information from the
respective ’sent’ registers, to respect the no-cloning theorem (classical information can still be
transmitted without being erased from the sender). Note that the way A can treat the transmitted
information is specified by the protocol Π and quantum mechanics, e.g. in case of a quantum
authentication channel between parties, A is only allowed to erase the content of the quantum
register but nothing more.
Setup phase: A defines the voting choices of all voters. C and A generate the protocol pa-
rameters and store them in the global register X (comprising of all local registers X𝑎). This
is done according to Π, therefore if the latter specifies that the parameters are generated
by a trusted third party, then this interaction is void. Instead, in protocols like the one in
section 4 where the parameters are generated interactively among the parties, this interaction
illustrates the fact that some of these parties might be corrupt. In order to also capture
protocols that use anonymous channels, we ask C to randomly choose a permutation 𝜌 from
the set F of all permutations of 𝑁 elements (the uniformly at random choice is denoted with
𝜌 ∈𝑅 F ). Permutation 𝜌 specifies the casting order of the voters and is initially unknown to
A; information about 𝜌 could however be leaked during the next phase.
Casting phase: The protocol Π specifies the algorithm CastBallot for generating the ballots.
C generates ballots according to the CastBallot algorithm on behalf of honest voters and A
on behalf of the corrupted ones.
Tally phase: The protocolΠ specifies the tallying algorithm Tally and the verification algorithm
Verify. The Verify algorithm is the protocol-specific public test parties can run to verify the
election. Note that if such an algorithm is not explicitly provided in the protocol’s description,
then it can be modelled by the True predicate (the algorithm will always return 1). If this test
is successful (return 1), the tally is then computed. If all talliers are honest, C computes the
election result on behalf of them by running the Tally algorithm. If some of the talliers are
corrupt, A and C produce the tally in an interactive way. If none of the talliers is honest,
A computes the tally instead. We capture all these cases with function Tally′, where honest
talliers controlled by C act according to Π and dishonest talliers act as A dictates.
Ideally, an e-voting protocol will satisfy at least the following properties [6, 15, 18, 22]. Correctness:
in the absence of an adversary, the correct outcome is computed; additionally, corrupted voters
cannot modify the honest votes, all voters vote at most once and the protocol does not abort
1
.
Privacy: keep the vote of a voter private. Verifiability: allow for verification of the results by voters
and external auditors. We focus on privacy and verifiability type properties. We note that our tally
function is defined similarly to [6]. Our definitions therefore capture only tally functions where the
election result corresponds to a unique set of votes (e.g it doesn’t capture privacy for ’weighted
1
All of the quantum protocols we analyse in this work are subject to abort by a single party except the one presented
in [40, 53]. Despite that, we present and focus on attacks that violate properties such as privacy and correctness by attacking
the one-voter-one-vote policy.
ACM Trans. Quantum Comput., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
111:6 Myrto Arapinis, Nikolaos Lamprou, Elham Kashefi, and Anna Pappa
voting’); however, this restriction is a natural assumption based on the state-of-the-art on e-voting
based protocols [2].
Universal Verifiability. Our definition of universal verifiability is similar to [15] and is captured
by the experiment EXPΠQver.
The experiment EXPΠQver (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)
– Setup phase: C andA generate the parameters in registerX as specified by Π and the adversarial
model. Furthermore,A chooses the votes for all voters {𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘 ∈V and C the casting order 𝜌 ∈𝑅 F .
– Casting phase: For 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
– If A chooses to corrupt 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) , they are added toVA .
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∉ VA , then C runs (X𝜌 (𝑘) ,⊥) ← CastBallot(𝑣𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝜌 (𝑘) , 𝛿0). If not ⊥, C calls
OΠ,A (X𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝑅), where 𝑅 is the receiver designated by Π.
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∈ VA , A performs some operation on register XA and calls OΠ,A (XA ,X𝑅), where 𝑅
is any receiver designated by A.
– Tally phase:A and C call the Tally′ function, which depends on Π and the adversarial model, to
compute the election outcome 𝑋 ← Tally′(XC,XA , 𝛿0).
– If (Verify(𝑋,XC, 𝛿0) = 1) and (PΠVCounted ({𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘∉VA , 𝑋 ) = 0 ∨ Nballots
Π (𝑋 ) > 𝑁 )
then output 1, else output 0.
First, A defines how honest voters vote. Then, C and A generate the protocol parameters X
according to Π and the corruption model of A. Moreover, C chooses at random a permutation
𝜌 that specifies the casting order of all voters. In the casting phase, A can choose to corrupt
voters adaptively. For honest voters, C follows the CastBallot algorithm as specified by Π to
generate the ballot, and sends it to A. Depending on the protocol specification, A might then
perform some quantum operation on the received ballot and further forward it to the designated
receiver. The operation should always be consistent with the protocol, e.g. if Π uses quantum
authenticated channels, A will not be able to modify the ballot. This process is captured by calling
the communication oracle O. For corrupted voters, A casts the ballot on their behalf. After all
votes have been cast, the election outcome is computed by Tally′ defined above, which depends on
the protocol Π and the adversarial model. EXPΠQver outputs 1 if the election outcome is accepted
by C, while either an honest vote has not been counted in the final outcome, or the number of
cast votes exceeds the number of voters; Otherwise the experiment outputs 0. To account for these
events, we define three predicates; Verify which is the protocol-specific public test parties can run
to verify the election, the predicate PΠVCounted reveals if honest votes are discarded from or altered
in the final outcome
2
and NballotsΠ reveals the number of votes accounted for the election result
𝑋 . Specifically, PΠVCounted captures exactly the two security properties of definition 2, p.9 in [15]. If
A has tampered with the election outcome, the predicate Verify should return false.
Definition 3.1. A quantum e-voting protocol Π satisfies 𝜖-quantum verifiability if for every
quantum polynomial-timeA the probability of winning experiment EXPΠQver (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0) is negligible
with respect to 𝛿0:
Pr[1← EXPΠQver (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)] = 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙 (𝛿0).
2
We require in particular that PΠVCounted ( {𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘∉VA ,⊥) = 0
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Vote privacy. The experiment EXPΠQpriv captures vote privacy which ensures that the adversary
A cannot link honest voters to their votes. We build upon definition 1 in [6]; however a problem
with this definition is that it requires the honest voters controlled by the challenger to send their
ballot in two separate ballot boxes. Such a process is not possible with quantum information due
to the no-cloning theorem; we solve this issue with our definition. Moreover, we also capture
self-tallying protocols, where [6] states explicitly that a secret key is required for the production
of the tally. Finally, our definition also treats protocols that use anonymous channels in order to
provide privacy, while [6] leaves out such protocols, since it states that the adversary can call the
oracle Ocast with the ballot and the voter’s ID. These fundamental differences lead to a completely
new experiment.
The goal of EXPΠQpriv is to capture that A cannot distinguish between ’two worlds’, one where
the voters vote as A tells them, and another where their votes have been permuted.
The experiment EXPΠQpriv (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)
– Setup phase: C andA generate the parameters in registerX as specified by Π and the adversarial
model. C chooses the casting order 𝜌 ∈𝑅 F and a bit 𝛽 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}. Furthermore, A chooses the
votes for all voters {𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘 ∈V and a permutation F ∈ F .
– Casting phase: For 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
– If A chooses to corrupt 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) , 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) is added toVA .
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∉ VA , then C runs {X𝜌 (𝑘) ,⊥} ← CastBallot(𝑣
𝛽
F(𝜌 (𝑘)) · 𝑣
1−𝛽
𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝜌 (𝑘) , 𝛿0). If not ⊥, C
calls OΠ,A (X𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝑅), , where 𝑅 is the receiver designated by Π.
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∈ VA , A performs some operations on register XA and calls OΠ,A (XA ,X𝑅), where
𝑅 is any receiver designated by A.
– Tally phase: If {𝑣𝑘 : 𝑉𝑘 ∉ VA } = {𝑣F(𝑘) : 𝑉𝑘 ∉ VA }, C announces the election outcome
𝑋 ← Tally(XC, 𝛿0) to A. Else output -1.
A guesses bit 𝛽∗. If 𝛽∗ = 𝛽 then output 1, else output 0.
A defines how honest voters vote and chooses a permutation F ∈ F over the voting choices of all
voters inV . After the parameters of the protocol X are generated, C chooses a random bit 𝛽 which
defines two worlds; when 𝛽 = 0, the honest voters vote as specified by A, while when 𝛽 = 1, the
honest voters swap their votes according to permutation F again specified by A. Again, C chooses
at random a permutation 𝜌 which defines the casting order of all voters. If the choices of the honest
voters during the casting phase are still a permutation of their initial choices the experiment
proceeds to the next phase, else it outputs −1. In the tally phase, C computes the election outcome.
Finally, A tries to guess if the honest voters controlled by C have permuted their votes (𝛽 = 1) or
not (𝛽 = 0), by outputting the guess bit 𝛽∗. If A guessed correctly EXPΠQpriv outputs 1; otherwise
EXPΠQpriv outputs 0.
Definition 3.2. A quantum e-voting protocolΠ satisfies 𝜖-quantumprivacy if for every quantum
polynomial-timeA the probability of winning the experiment EXPΠQpriv (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0) is negligibly close
to 1/2 with respect to 𝛿0 under the condition event ¬False_Attack happens, where False_Attack =
{−1← EXPΠQpriv (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)}:
Pr[1← EXPΠQpriv (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0) |¬False_Attack] ≤ 1/2 + 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙 (𝛿0)
The most established game-based definitions for privacy in the classical setting [6] assume two
ballot boxes, where one holds the real tally and the other holds either the real or the fake tally. In
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the quantum case, the adaptation is not straightforward mainly because of the no-cloning theorem.
The existence of two such boxes assumes that information is copyable, which is not the case with
quantum information. Similarly, we can’t assume that the experiment runs two times because
A could correlate the two executions by entangling their parameters, something that a classical
adversary cannot do. We address this difficulty by introducing quantum communication oracles to
capture the network activity and model the special handling of quantum information (e.g entangled
states). Moreover, the election result is produced on the actual ballots rather than the intended
ones. With this, we capture a broader spectrum of attacks (e.g Helios replay attack) and at the same
time introduce trivial distinctions corresponding to false attacks. We tackle this by allowing the
experiment to output -1 in such undesired cases which are mainly artifacts of the model. So an
advantage of our privacy definition is that it allows the analysis of self-tallying type protocols in
contrast with previous definitions of privacy [6]. In self-tallying elections the adversary is able to
derive the election outcome on their own without the need of secret information.
Note. Our definitions of verifiability and privacy capture both classical and quantum protocols.
For the classical case, the quantum registers will be used for storing and communicating purely
classical information. Devising our definitions for the quantum setting was not a trivial task as
there are many aspects that are hard to define, like bulletin boards, and others that need to be
introduced, like quantum registers potentially containing entangled quantum states. Moreover, our
experiments capture protocols that use anonymous channels, by assuming that the casting order
is unknown to A, as well as self-tallying protocols. We leave as future work the investigation of
soundness of our definitions. To this end, one would define an ideal functionality capturing privacy
and verifiability, and prove the soundness relation between our game-based definitions and this
ideal functionality similarly to [6].
In the rest of the paper, we examine all existing proposals for quantum e-voting. For each of them,
we identify attacks that violate the previously defined properties. Note that since the proposed
protocols do not involve any verifiability mechanism, we need to define an experiment that involves
honest Talliers, and that captures security against double voting and vote deletion/alteration against
malicious voters. We term this property correctness and therefore need to consider experiment
EXPΠQcorr which is the same as EXP
Π
Qver but without the predicate Verify. The experiment EXP
Π
Qcorr
is detailed in Section A of the Supplementary Material.
4 DUAL BASIS MEASUREMENT BASED PROTOCOLS
In this section we discuss protocols that use the dual basis measurement technique [27, 51], and
use as a blank ballot an entangled state with an interesting property: when measured in the
computational basis, the sum of the outcomes is equal to zero, while when measured in the Fourier
basis, all the outcomes are equal. Both of these protocols use cut-and-choose techniques in order to
verify that the state was distributed correctly. This means that a large amount of states are checked
for correctness and a remaining few are kept at the end unmeasured, to proceed with the rest
of the protocol. Although a cut-and-choose technique with just one verifying party is secure if
the states that are sampled are exponentially many and the remaining ones are constant, it is not
clear how this generalizes to multiple verifying parties. Specifically, we show that if the corrupted
parties sample their states last, then the probability with which the corrupted states are not checked
and remain after all the honest parties sample, is at least a constant with respect to the security
parameter of the protocol.
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4.1 Protocol Specification
We will now present the self-tallying protocol of [51], which is based on the classical protocol of
[30]. The voters {𝑉𝑘 }𝑁𝑘=1, without the presence of any trusted authority or tallier, need to verify
that they share specific quantum states. At the end of the verification process, the voters share a
classical matrix; every cast vote is equal to the sum of the elements of a row in the matrix.
Setup phase









|𝑖1⟩ |𝑖2⟩ . . . |𝑖𝑁 ⟩
where 𝑚 is the dimension of the qudits’ Hilbert space, 𝑐 is the number of the possible
candidates such that𝑚 ≥ 𝑐 and 𝛿0 the security parameter. The voter also shares 1 + 𝑁2𝛿0







|𝑖1⟩ |𝑖2⟩ . . . |𝑖𝑁 ⟩
where P𝑁 is the set of all possible permutations with 𝑁 elements. Each 𝑉𝑘 receives the 𝑘𝑡ℎ
particle from each of the states.
(2) The voters agree that the states they receive are indeed |𝐷1⟩ , |𝐷2⟩ by using a cut-and choose
technique. Specifically, voter 𝑉𝑘 chooses at random 2
𝛿0
of the |𝐷1⟩ states and asks the other
voters to measure half of their particles in the computational and half in the Fourier basis.
Whenever the chosen basis is the computational, the measurement results need to add up
to 0, while when the basis is the Fourier, then the measurement results are all the same. All
voters simultaneously broadcast their results and if one of them notices a discrepancy, the
protocol aborts. The states |𝐷2⟩ are similarly checked.
(3) The voters are left to share 𝑁 copies of |𝐷1⟩ states and one |𝐷2⟩ state. Each voter holds one
qudit for each state. They now all measure their qudits in the computational basis. As a result,
each𝑉𝑘 holds a “blank ballot" of dimension 𝑁 with the measurement outcomes corresponding
to parts of |𝐷1⟩ states:
𝐵𝑘 = [b1𝑘 · · · b
𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑘
· · · b𝑁
𝑘
]⊺
and a unique index, 𝑠𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑁 }, from the measurement outcome of the qudit that






= 0 mod 𝑐 for all
𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 .
Casting phase
(4) Based on 𝑠𝑘𝑘 , all voters add their vote, 𝑣𝑘 ∈ Z𝑐 , to the corresponding row of their “secret”






(5) All voters simultaneously broadcast their columns, resulting in a public 𝑁 × 𝑁 table, whose









· · · b𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑘
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Tally phase
(6) Each 𝑉𝑘 verifies that their vote is counted by checking that the corresponding row of the
matrix adds up to their vote. If this fails, the protocol aborts.
(7) Each voter can tally the final outcome of the election by computing the sum of the elements
of each row of the public 𝑁 ×𝑁 table. The resulting 𝑁 elements are the result of the election.
4.2 Vulnerabilities Of Dual Basis Measurement Protocols
In this section we present an attack on the cut-and-choose technique of the protocol in the setup
phase, that can be used to violate privacy. We consider a static adversary that corrupts 𝑡 voters,
including the one that distributes the states. Suppose that the adversary corrupts 𝑁 out of 𝑁 +𝑁 2𝛿0
states |𝐷1⟩. We denote with Bad, the event that all the corrupted voters choose last which states
they want to test, and withWin, the event that the 𝑁 corrupted states are not checked. We want
to compute the probability that event Win happens, given event Bad, i.e. the probability none
of the 𝑁 corrupted states is checked by the honest voters, and therefore remain intact until the
corrupted voters’ turn. The corrupted voters will of course not sample any of the corrupted states
and therefore the corrupted states will be accepted as valid.
The number of corrupted states that an honest voter will check, follows a mixture distribution
with each mixture component being one of the hypergeometric distributions {HG(𝐿𝑖𝑘 , 𝑏𝑖𝑘 , 2𝛿0 ) :
0 ≤ 𝑏𝑖𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 } , where 𝐿𝑖𝑘 is the number of states left to sample from the previous voter and 𝑏𝑖𝑘 the
number of the remaining corrupted states. We can therefore define the random variable 𝑋𝑖𝑘 that
follows the above mixture distribution, where 𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑁−𝑡 is a permutation of the honest voters’
indices (by slightly abusing notation, we consider the first 𝑁 − 𝑡 voters to be honest). The following
lemma is proven by induction:




𝑋𝑖𝑘 = 0] =
𝑁−𝑡∏
𝑘=1
Pr[𝑋 ∗𝑖𝑘 = 0] where 𝑋
∗
𝑖𝑘
∼ HG(𝐿𝑖𝑘 , 𝑁 , 2𝛿0 ).
We are now ready to prove that with at least a constant probability, the corrupted states will
remain intact until the end of the verification process.
Proposition 4.2. For 0 < Y < 1, let 𝑡 = Y𝑁 be the fraction of voters controlled by the adversary. It
holds that :





Pr[Win | Bad] = Pr[
𝑁−𝑡∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑋𝑖𝑘 = 0] =
𝑁−𝑡∏
𝑘=1
















(𝑁 + 𝑡2𝛿0 − 𝑁 + 1) · . . . · (𝑁 + 𝑡2𝛿0 )
(𝑁 + 𝑁 2𝛿0 − 𝑁 + 1) · . . . · (𝑁 + 𝑁 2𝛿0 )
>
( 𝑡2𝛿0 + 1




𝑁 + 𝑁 2𝛿0
+ 1
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The question now is with what probability event Bad occurs, i.e how likely is the fact that
voters controlled by the adversary are asked to sample last? The answer is irrelevant, because this
probability depends on 𝑁 and 𝑡 , and are both independent of 𝛿0. As a result,
Pr[Win] > Pr[Win | Bad] Pr[Bad] = (Y/2)𝑁 𝑓 (𝑁, 𝑡)
where 𝑓 (𝑁, 𝑡) is a constant function with respect to the security parameter 𝛿0, making Pr[Win]
non-negligible in 𝛿0. As a matter of fact, a static adversary will corrupt the voters that maximize
Pr[Bad]. Therefore, we can assume that the honest voters sample the states at random, in order to
not favor sets of corrupted voters. Now let us examine how this affects the privacy of the scheme.
Theorem 4.3. Let Π(𝑁, 𝑡, 𝛿0) be an execution of the self-tallying protocol with 𝑁 voters, 𝑡 of them
corrupted, and 𝛿0 the security parameter. We can construct an adversaryA, which with non-negligible
probability in 𝛿0 violates privacy.
Proof. Let CA be the set of indices of the corrupted voters with |CA | = 𝑡 . Suppose the voter
distributing the states is also corrupted, and prepares 1 + 𝑁2𝛿0 states of the form of |𝐷2⟩, 𝑁2𝛿0
states of the form |𝐷1⟩ and 𝑁 states of the form:
|𝐷Corrupt⟩ = |b1⟩ ⊗ . . . ⊗ |b𝑁 ⟩
where b𝑘 ∈𝑅 {0, . . . , 𝑐 − 1} for all 𝑘 ∈ {2, . . . , 𝑁 }, b1 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑐 − 1} such that3:
b1 + . . . + b𝑁 = 0 mod 𝑐
From Proposition 4.2 and the previous observations we know that the probability that states
|𝐷Corrupt⟩ remain intact after the verification procedure in step 2 (i.e. event Win), happens with
non-negligible probability in the security parameter 𝛿0. Therefore, with non-negligible probability,
the remaining states in step 3 are: one of the form |𝐷2⟩ and 𝑁 of the form |𝐷Corrupt⟩. All honest
voters 𝑉𝑘 measure their qudits in the computational basis and end up with a secret number 𝑠𝑘𝑘
(from measuring the corresponding part of |𝐷2⟩) and a column
𝐵𝑘 = [b1𝑘 . . . b
𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑘
. . . b𝑁
𝑘
]⊺
(from measuring states |𝐷Corrupt⟩), that is known to the adversary. Now all voters apply their vote






. . . b
𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑘
+ 𝑣𝑘 . . . b𝑁𝑘 ]
⊺
At this point all voters simultaneously broadcast their 𝐵
𝑣𝑘
𝑘
, as the protocol specifies, and end up
with the matrix 𝐵 = (𝐵𝑣1
1
. . . 𝐵
𝑣𝑁
𝑁
). Each 𝑉𝑘 , 𝑘 ∉ CA checks that
𝑁∑︁
𝑗=1
𝐵 [𝑠𝑘𝑘 , 𝑗] = 𝑣𝑘 mod 𝑐
which happens with probability 1 from the description of the attack in the previous steps. As a
result, each voter accepts the election result. The adversary knowing both the pre-vote matrix and
the post-vote matrix can therefore extract the vote of all honest voters. □
A similar attack can be mounted if the adversary instead of corrupting 𝑁 out of 𝑁 + 𝑁 2𝛿0 |𝐷1⟩
states, corrupts just 1 of the |𝐷2⟩ states. The attack is similar to the one mentioned above but in
this case the adversary knows the row in which each voter voted instead of the pre-vote matrix.
Moreover, the probability of theorem 4.2 is improved from (Y/2)𝑁 to Y/2 (the proof works in a
similar way).
3∈𝑅 denotes that the element is chosen uniformly at random from a specific domain.
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Based on the previous observations we can construct an adversary that violates 𝜖-quantum
privacy for any 0 < 𝜖 < 1 and any non-trivial permutation.
Theorem 4.4. The quantum self tallying protocol Π(𝑁, 𝑁 /𝜖, 𝛿0) doesn’t satisfy the 𝜖-quantum
privacy property for any 0 < 𝜖 < 1.
Proof. (sketch) First A picks a non-trivial permutation FA . It is easy to see that A can corrupt
the quantum states in experiment EXPΠQpriv and C will accept with probability at least 𝛼 (𝛿0) the
corrupted parameters, where 𝛼 () a non negligible function, based on proposition 4.2. Next, A can
read all the quantum registers X𝑗 one by one when the oracle query OΠ,A (X𝑗 ,X𝑅) is issued, and
therefore find out how each voter voted as in theorem 4.3. As a result, A can find out whether the
honest voters have permuted their votes and guess the challenge bit 𝛽 with probability at least
1/2 + 𝛼 (𝛿0). Note that in this case, Pr[EXPΠQpriv → −1] = 0 , because A can choose which voters
to corrupt such that both the cut-and-choose attack in the Setup phase is successful and the
condition {𝑣𝑘 : 𝑉𝑘 ∉ VA} = {𝑣F(𝑘) : 𝑉𝑘 ∉ VA} holds. □
So far we have seen how voters’ privacy can be violated if an adversary distributes the quantum
states in the protocol. However, even if the sharing of the states is done honestly by a trusted
authority, still an adversary A can violate the privacy of a voter. This is done by replacing one
element in a column of one of the players controlled by A with a random number. As a result, in
step 6, the honest voter whose row doesn’t pass the test, will abort the protocol by broadcasting
it. A will therefore know the identity of the voter aborting and their corresponding vote, since it
knows the matrix before the modification of the column element. Similarly, in experiment EXPΠQpriv
the adversary can find out if the voters permute their vote or not.
A possible solution might be to use a classical anonymous broadcast channel, so that the voters
can anonymously broadcast abort if they detect any misbehaviour at step 6. However, this might
open a path to other types of attacks, like denial-of-service, and requires further study in order to
be a viable solution.
5 TRAVELING BALLOT BASED PROTOCOLS
In this section we discuss the traveling ballot family of protocols for referendum type elections.
Here,𝑇 also plays the role of 𝐸𝐴, as it sets up the parameters of the protocol in addition to producing
the election result. Specifically, it prepares two entangled qudits, and sends one of them (the ballot
qudit) to travel from voter to voter. When the voters receive the ballot qudit, they apply some
unitary operation according to their vote and forward the qudit to the next voter. When all voters
have voted, the ballot qudit is sent back to 𝑇 who measures the whole state to compute the result
of the referendum. The first quantum scheme in this category was introduced by Vaccaro et al. [50]
and later improved [7, 25, 33].
5.1 Protocol Specification
Here we present the travelling ballot protocol of [25]; an alternative form [50] encodes the vote in
a phase factor rather than in the qudit itself.




| 𝑗⟩𝑉 | 𝑗⟩𝑇 , keeps the second qudit and passes
the first (the ballot qudit) to voter 𝑉1.




| 𝑗 + 1⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 |, where 𝑣𝑘 = 1 signifies a “yes vote and 𝑣𝑘 = 0 a “no” vote (i.e. applying the
identity operator). Then, 𝑉𝑘 forwards the ballot qudit to the next voter 𝑉𝑘+1 and 𝑉𝑁 to to 𝑇 .
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| 𝑗 +𝑚⟩𝑉 | 𝑗⟩𝑇
where𝑚 is the number of "yes" votes. 𝑇 measures the two qudits in the computational basis,
subtracts the two results and obtains the outcome𝑚.
5.2 Vulnerabilities Of Traveling Ballot Based Protocols
The first obvious weakness of this type of protocols is that they are subject to double voting. A
corrupted voter can apply the “yes” unitary operation many times without being detected (this
issue is addressed in the next session, where we study the distributed ballot voting schemes). As a
result we can easily construct an adversaryA that wins in the correctness experiment described in
the Appendix (Figure A) with probability 1. Furthermore, these protocols are subject to privacy
attacks, when several voters are colluding. In what follows, we describe such an attack on privacy,
in the case of two colluding voters. Figure 1 depicts this attack.
Let us assume that the adversary corrupts voters𝑉𝑘−1 and𝑉𝑘+1 for any𝑘 . Upon receipt of the ballot
qudit, instead of applying the appropriate unitary, 𝑉𝑘−1 performs a measurement on the traveling
ballot in the computational basis. As a result the global state becomes |Ω𝑘−1⟩ = |ℎ +𝑚⟩𝑉 ⊗ |ℎ⟩𝑇 ,
where |ℎ +𝑚⟩𝑉 is one of the possible eigenstates of the observable 𝑂 =
𝑁−1∑
𝑗=0
| 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 |, and 𝑚 is
the number of “yes” votes cast by the voters 𝑉1, . . . ,𝑉𝑘−2 (note that 𝑉𝑘−1 does not get any other
information about the votes of the previous voters, except number ℎ +𝑚). Then 𝑉𝑘−1 passes the
ballot qudit |ℎ +𝑚⟩𝑉 to 𝑉𝑘 , who applies the respective unitary for voting “yes” or “no”. As a result
the ballot qudit is in the state |ℎ +𝑚 + 𝑣𝑘⟩𝑉 . Next, the ballot qudit is forwarded to the corrupted
voter 𝑉𝑘+1, who measures it again in the computational basis and gets the result ℎ +𝑚 + 𝑣𝑘 . A
can now infer vote 𝑣𝑘 from the two measurement results and figure out how 𝑉𝑘+1 voted. Similarly,
A can guess the correct bit 𝛽 in EXPΠQpriv with probability 1 by measuring the quantum registers
X𝑘−1 and X𝑘+1, where 𝑉𝑘 an honest party (A might need to corrupt two more voters such that
EXPΠQpriv will not output -1). The same attack can also be applied in the case where there are many
voters between the two corrupted parties. In this case the adversary can’t learn the individual
votes but only the total votes. One suggestion presented in [50] is to allow 𝑇 to perform extra
measurements to detect a malicious action during the protocol’s execution. However, this only
identifies an attack and does not prevent the adversary from learning some of the votes, as described
above. Furthermore, the probability of detecting a deviation from the protocol is constant and as
such does not depend on the security parameter and does not lead to a substantial improvement
of security. It should also be noted that verifiability of the election result is not addressed in any
of these works, since 𝑇 is assumed to generate the initial state honestly. In the case where 𝑇 is
corrupted, privacy is trivially violated.
All traveling ballot protocols proposed ([7, 25, 33, 50]) suffer from the above privacy attack.
Next, we discuss how this issue has been addressed by revisiting the structure of the protocols.
Unfortunately, as we will see, new issues arise.
6 DISTRIBUTED BALLOT BASED PROTOCOLS
Here we describe the family of quantum distributed ballot protocols [7, 25, 50]. In these schemes,𝑇
prepares and distributes to each voter a blank ballot, and gathers it back after all voters have cast
their vote in order to compute the final outcome. This type of protocols give strong guarantees for
privacy against other voters but not against a malicious 𝑇 which is trusted to prepare correctly
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Fig. 1. A corrupts voters 𝑉𝑘−1,𝑉𝑘+1 and learns how voter 𝑉𝑘 voted with probability 1.
specific states. So it is not hard to see that if the states are not the correct ones, then the privacy of
a voter can be violated.
A first attempt presented in [50] suffers from double voting similarly to the discussion in the
previous section. The same problem also appears in [19]. Later works [7, 25] address this issue with
a very elaborate countermeasure. The intuition behind the proposed technique is that 𝑇 chooses a
secret number 𝛿 according to which it prepares two different quantum states: the “yes” and the “no”
states. This 𝛿 value is hard to predict due to the non-orthogonality of the shared states and the
no-cloning theorem. The authors suggest that many rounds of the protocol be executed. As a result,
any attempt of the adversary to learn 𝛿 gives rise to a different result in each round. However, the
number of required rounds, as well as a rigorous proof are not presented in the study.
More importantly, a careful analysis reveals that the proposed solution is still vulnerable to
double voting. As we will see, an adversary can mount what we call a 𝑑-transfer attack, and transfer
𝑑 votes for one option of the referendum election to the other. To achieve this attack, the adversary
does not need to find the exact value of 𝛿 (as the authors believed), but knowing the difference of the
angles used to create the “yes” and “no” states suffices. We construct a quantum polynomial-time
adversary that performs the 𝑑-transfer attack with probability at least 0.25, if the number of rounds
is smaller than exponential in the number of voters. As a result this makes the protocol practically
unrealistic for large scale elections.
6.1 Protocol Specification
We first present the protocol from [7, 25]:
Setup phase
(1) 𝑇 prepares an 𝑁 -qudit ballot state: |Φ⟩ = 1√
𝐷
∑𝐷−1
𝑗=0 | 𝑗⟩⊗𝑁 , where the states | 𝑗⟩ , 𝑗 = 0, ..., 𝐷 −1,
form an orthonormal basis for the 𝐷-dimensional Hilbert space, and 𝐷 > 𝑁 . The 𝑘-th qudit
of |Φ⟩ corresponds to 𝑉𝑘 ’s blank ballot.
(2) 𝑇 sends to 𝑉𝑘 the corresponding blank ballot together with two option qudits, one for the
“yes” and one for the “no” option:










𝑒𝑖 𝑗\𝑛 | 𝑗⟩
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For 𝑣 ∈ {𝑦, 𝑛} we have \𝑣 = (2𝜋𝑙𝑣/𝐷) + 𝛿 , where 𝑙𝑣 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝐷 − 1} and 𝛿 ∈ [0, 2𝜋/𝐷).
Values 𝑙𝑦 and 𝛿 are chosen uniformly at random from their domain and 𝑙𝑛 is chosen such that
𝑁 (𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 mod 𝐷) < 𝐷 . These values are known only to 𝑇 .
Casting phase
(3) Each 𝑉𝑘 decides on “yes” or “no” by appending the corresponding option qudit to the blank
ballot and performing a 2-qudit measurement 𝑅 =
∑𝐷−1




| 𝑗 + 𝑟 ⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 + 𝑟 | ⊗ | 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 |
According to the result 𝑟𝑘 , 𝑉𝑘 performs a unitary correction 𝑈𝑟𝑘 = I ⊗
∑𝐷−1
𝑗=0 | 𝑗 + 𝑟𝑘⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | and
sends the 2-qudits ballot along with 𝑟𝑘 back to 𝑇 .
Tally phase














𝑣 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑟𝑘 − 1
𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟𝑘 )\
𝑘
𝑣 𝑟𝑘 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐷 − 1




𝑒−𝑖𝐷𝛿 | 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | +
𝐷−1∑︁
𝑗=𝑟𝑘
| 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 |
on one of the qudits in the global state (it is not important on which one, since changes to








𝑒𝑖 𝑗 (𝑚\𝑦+(𝑁−𝑚)\𝑛) | 𝑗⟩⊗2𝑁
where𝑚 is the number of “yes” votes.
(6) By applying the unitary operator
∑𝐷−1
𝑗=0 𝑒
−𝑖 𝑗𝑁\𝑛 | 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | on one of the qudits and setting 𝑞 =







𝑒2𝜋𝑖 𝑗𝑞/𝐷 | 𝑗⟩⊗2𝑁
We note here that 𝑞 must be between 0 and 𝐷 − 1, so that the different outcomes be distinguishable.
Now with the corresponding measurement 𝑇 can retrieve 𝑞. Since 𝑇 knows values 𝑙𝑦 and 𝑙𝑛 , it
can derive the number𝑚 of "yes" votes. Note that if a voter does not send back a valid ballot, the
protocol execution aborts.
6.2 Vulnerabilities Of Distributed Ballot Protocols
In this section, we show how the adversary can perform the 𝑑-transfer attack in favor of the “yes”
outcome. We proceed as follows. We first show that this is possible if the adversary knows the
difference 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 . We then show how the adversary can find out this value, and conclude the
section with the probabilistic analysis of our attack which establishes that it can be performed with
overwhelming probability in the number of voters.
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The d-transfer attack: Given the difference 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 , a dishonest voter can violate the no-double-
voting. From the definition of 𝑙𝑦 and 𝑙𝑛 it holds that:
2𝜋 (𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛)/𝐷 = \𝑦 − \𝑛 (1)
If a corrupted voter (e.g. 𝑉1) knows 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 , then they proceed as follows (w.l.o.g. we assume that
they want to increase the number of “yes” votes by 𝑑):
(1) 𝑉1 applies the unitary operator: 𝐶𝑑 =
𝐷−1∑
𝑗=0
𝑒𝑖 𝑗𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛) | 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | to the received option qudit
|𝜓 (\𝑦)⟩. As a result, the state becomes:






𝑒𝑖 𝑗𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛)𝑒𝑖 𝑗\𝑦 | 𝑗⟩
(2) 𝑉1 now performs the 2-qudit measurement specified in the Casting phase of the protocol and
obtains the outcome 𝑟1.
(3) 𝑉1 performs the unitary correction𝑈𝑟1 . For
˜\ = 𝑑 (\𝑦 − \𝑛) + \𝑦 , the global state now is:
𝑈𝑟1𝑃𝑟1
(















(4) Before sending the two qudit ballot and the value 𝑟1 to𝑇 ,𝑉1 performs the following operation
to the option qudit:
Correct𝑟1 =
{
𝑒−𝑖𝐷𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛) | 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑟1 − 1
| 𝑗⟩ ⟨ 𝑗 | 𝑟1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐷 − 1








𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟1)𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛)𝑒𝑖 (𝐷+𝑗−𝑟1)\𝑦
𝑁∏
𝑘=2




𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟1)𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛)𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟1)\𝑦
𝑁∏
𝑘=2






𝑣 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑟𝑘 − 1
𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟𝑘 )\
𝑘
𝑣 𝑟𝑘 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐷 − 1
and \𝑘𝑣 describes the vote of voter𝑉𝑘 , where 𝑣 ∈ {𝑦, 𝑛}.𝑇 just follows the protocol specification.







𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟1)𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛)𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟1)\𝑦 · . . . · 𝑒𝑖 ( 𝑗−𝑟𝑛)\𝑛𝑣 | 𝑗⟩⊗2𝑁






𝑒𝑖 𝑗𝑑 (\𝑦−\𝑛)𝑒𝑖 𝑗 (𝑚\𝑦+(𝑁−𝑚)\𝑛) | 𝑗⟩⊗2𝑁
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𝑒2𝜋𝑖 𝑗 (𝑚+𝑑) (𝑙𝑦−𝑙𝑛)/𝐷 | 𝑗⟩⊗2𝑁
(7) After measuring the state, the result is𝑚 + 𝑑 instead of𝑚.
Finding the difference between 𝑙𝑦 and 𝑙𝑛:What remains in order to complete our attack is to find
the difference 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 . We now show how an adversary can learn this difference with overwhelming
probability in 𝑁 . We assume that the adversary controls a fraction Y of the voters (0 < Y < 1), who
are (all but one) instructed to vote half the times "yes" and the other half "no". Instead of destroying
the remaining option qudits (exactly Y𝑁 /2 "yes" and Y𝑁 /2 "no" votes), the adversary keeps them to
run Algorithm 1. In essence, the algorithm is executed twice - once for each set of option qudits
Algorithm 1 Adversary’s algorithm
Input: 𝐷, |𝜓 (\𝑣 ) ⟩1 , · · · , |𝜓 (\𝑣 ) ⟩Y𝑁 /2
Output:
˜𝑙 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝐷 − 1}
1: Record = [0, . . . , 0] ∈ N1×𝐷 ; ⊲ This vector shows us how many values are observed in each interval
2: Solution = [”𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”, ”𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”] ∈ N1×2 ;
3: 𝑖, 𝑙,𝑚 = 0;
4: while 𝑖 ≤ Y𝑁 /2 do
5: Measure |𝜓 (\𝑣 ) ⟩𝑖 by using POVM operator 𝐸 (\ ) from Eq.(2), the result is 𝑦𝑖 ;
6: Find the interval for which
2𝜋 𝑗
𝐷
≤ 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 2𝜋 ( 𝑗+1)𝐷 ;
7: Record[ 𝑗 ] =++;
8: 𝑖++;
9: end while
10: while 𝑙 < 𝐷 do
11: if Record[𝑙 ] ≥ 40%(Y𝑁 /2) then
12: Solution[𝑚] = 𝑙 ;
13: 𝑚 + +;
14: end if
15: 𝑙 + +;
16: end while
17: if Solution == [0, 𝐷 − 1] then




{|𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩}Y𝑁 /2, where 𝑣 ∈ {𝑦, 𝑛}. It measures the states in each set and attributes to each one an
integer. After all states have been measured, the algorithm creates a vector Record, which contains
the number of times each integer appeared during the measurements. Finally, Algorithm 1 creates
the vector Solution in which it registers the values that appeared at least 40% of times during the
measurements, equivalently the values for which the Record vector assigned a number greater or
equal than 40% of times. The algorithm outputs the first value in the Solution vector. As we see
in Figure 2, with high probability the value that algorithm outputs is either 𝑙𝑣 or 𝑙𝑣 − 1, for both
values of 𝑣 . Hence, we can find the difference 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 . After having acquired knowledge of 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 ,
the adversary can instruct the last corrupted voter to change the outcome of the voting process as
previously described.
Probabilistic analysisWe prove here that the adversary’s algorithm succeeds with overwhelming
probability in 𝑁 , where 𝑁 is the number of voters. Therefore, as we later prove in Theorem 6.8,
the election protocol needs to run at least exponentially many times with respect to 𝑁 in order
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Fig. 2. The probabilities with which Algorithm 1 records a value in {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1} after measuring state
|𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ for 𝛿1 = 𝜋
2
35
, 𝛿2 = 𝜋
2
30





to guarantee that the success probability of the adversary is at most 0.25. We present here the
necessary lemmas and give the full proofs in the Supplementary Material.
In order to compute the success probability of the attack, we first need to compute the probability
of measuring a value in the interval (𝑥𝑙 , 𝑥𝑙+𝑤), where 𝑥𝑙 =
2𝜋𝑙
𝐷
, 𝑙 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 𝐷 − 1}4.
Lemma 6.1. Let Θ𝑣
𝐷,𝛿
∈ [0, 2𝜋] be the continuous random variable that describes the outcome of the
measurement of an option qudit |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ , 𝑣 ∈ {y, n} using operators:
𝐸 (\ ) = 𝐷
2𝜋
|Φ(\ )⟩ ⟨Φ(\ ) | (2)




𝑒𝑖 𝑗\ | 𝑗⟩. It holds that:






2 [𝐷 (\ − \𝑣)/2]
sin
2 [(\ − \𝑣)/2]
𝑑\
According to Algorithm 1, an option qudit is attributed with the correct value 𝑙𝑣 when the result of
the measurement is in the interval [𝑥𝑙𝑣 , 𝑥𝑙𝑣+1]. Using Lemma 6.1, we can prove the following:
Lemma 6.2. Let |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ be an option qudit of the protocol. Then it holds:
Pr[𝑥𝑙𝑣 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙𝑣+1] > 0.405
Lemma 6.2 shows that with probability at least 0.405, the result of the measurement is in the interval
(𝑥𝑙𝑣 , 𝑥𝑙𝑣+1). Since Algorithm 1 inserts an integer to the Solution vector if it corresponds to at least
40% of the total measured values, 𝑙𝑣 will most likely be included in the vector (we formally prove it
later). Furthermore, we prove now that with high probability, there will be no other values to be
inserted in Solution, except the neighbours of the value 𝑙𝑣 (namely 𝑙𝑣 ± 1).
Lemma 6.3. Let |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ be an option qudit of the protocol. Then it holds:
𝑃𝑟 [𝑥𝑙𝑣−1 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙𝑣+2] > 0.9
Here we need to note that we are aware of the cases 𝑙𝑣 ∈ {0, 𝐷 − 1} where the members 𝑥𝑙𝑣−1 and
𝑥𝑙𝑣+2 are not defined. It turns out not to be a problem and the same thing can be proven for these
values (see Supplementary Material).
4
It is convenient to think of 𝑙 as the 𝐷𝑡ℎ roots of unity.
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We have shown that the probability the measurement outcome lies in the interval (𝑥𝑙𝑣−1, 𝑥𝑙𝑣+2),
and therefore gets attributed with a value of 𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣 or 𝑙𝑣 + 1, is larger than 0.9. If we treat each
measurement performed by Algorithm 1 on each option qudit |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩, as an independent Bernoulli
trial with success probability 𝑝𝑙 = 𝑃𝑟 [𝑥𝑙 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙+1], we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.4. With overwhelming probability in the number of voters 𝑁 , Algorithm 1 includes 𝑙𝑣
in the Solution vector
Pr[Solution[0] = 𝑙𝑣 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑙𝑣] > 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
We have proven that with overwhelming probability in 𝑁 , integer 𝑙𝑣 occupies one of the two
positions of vector Solution, but what about the other value? In the next theorem, we show that
with overwhelming probability in 𝑁 , the other value is one of the neighbours of 𝑙𝑣 , namely 𝑙𝑣 + 1 or
𝑙𝑣 − 1.
Theorem 6.5. With negligible probability in the number of voters 𝑁 , Algorithm 1 includes a value
other than (𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1) in the Solution vector, i.e. ∀𝑤 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑙𝑣 − 2, 𝑙𝑣 + 2, . . . , 𝐷 − 1} :
Pr[Solution[0] = 𝑤 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑤] < 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Lemma 6.6. With overwhelming probability in 𝑁 , the Solution vector in Algorithm 1, is equal to
[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, ”𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”] or [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]. Specifically,
Pr[Solution ∈ {[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, ”𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”], [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]}] > 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Now consider we have two executions of the Algorithm 1, one for the "yes" and one for the "no"
option qudits. It turns out that the values in the positions 𝑙𝑦 − 1 and 𝑙𝑛 − 1 of the vector Record,
follow the same Binomial distribution (it is easy to see that 𝑝𝑙𝑦−1 = 𝑝𝑙𝑛−1). Also, each of them can
be seen as a function of 𝛿 which is a monotonic decreasing function that takes a maximum value
for 𝛿 = 0 (the proof technique is similar to Lemma 6.2). At this point the probability is equal to
𝑝𝑙𝑣 , which is at least 0.405 as we have proven in Lemma 6.2
5
. Armed with this observation we can
prove the next theorem.
Theorem 6.7. If we define the event "Cheat" as:
𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 =
[
𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜 (𝑦) −𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜 (𝑛) = 𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛
]
where 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜 (𝑣) is the execution of Algorithm 1 with 𝑣 ∈ {𝑦, 𝑛}, then it holds that:
𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”] > 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Proof. (sketch) We have seen that there exists a 𝛿0 such that the probability 𝑝𝑙𝑣−1 is equal to 0.4
for both values of 𝑣 . It holds that:
𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”] = 𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”|𝛿 ∈ [0, 𝛿0)] · 𝑃𝑟 [𝛿 ∈ [0, 𝛿0)]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”|𝛿 = 𝛿0] · 𝑃𝑟 [𝛿 = 𝛿0]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”|𝛿 ∈ (𝛿0, 2𝜋/𝐷)] · 𝑃𝑟 [𝛿 ∈ (𝛿0, 2𝜋/𝐷)]
For the first interval, for both values of 𝑣 , Algorithm 1 registers Solution = [𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣] with
overwhelming probability in 𝑁 . This holds because of Theorem 6.6 and the previous observation.
Therefore, for both values of 𝑣 the algorithm outputs the values 𝑙𝑣 − 1. As a result, 𝑙𝑦 − 1− (𝑙𝑛 − 1) =
𝑙𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛 .
For the second term, 𝑃𝑟 [𝛿 = 𝛿0] = 0, because 𝛿 is a continuous random variable. Finally, in the
last term, the probability that the algorithm registers Solution = [𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣] is negligible in 𝑁 ,
5
The same holds for the 𝑝𝑙𝑦+1, 𝑝𝑙𝑛+1 except that probability is a monotonic increasing function with maximum value at
point 𝛿 = 2𝜋/𝐷 and value equal to 𝑝𝑙𝑣 .
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and by Theorem 6.6, Solution has the form [𝑙𝑣] or [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]. So for both values of 𝑣 , the printed
values are 𝑙𝑦 and 𝑙𝑛 .
□
At this point we have proven that the adversary succeeds with overwhelming probability in 𝑁
to perform the 𝑑-transfer attack in one round. But how many rounds should the protocol run in
order to prevent this attack?
In the next theorem we prove that if the number of rounds is at most 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )), the adversary
succeeds with probability at least 0.25. Although in a small election these numbers might not be
big, in a large scale election it is infeasible to run the protocol as many times, making it either
inefficient or insecure. We also note that the probabilistic analysis for one round is independent of
the value 𝐷 , so cannot be used to improve the security of the protocol.
Theorem 6.8. Let ( |Φ⟩ , |𝜓 (\𝑦)⟩ , |𝜓 (\𝑛)⟩ , 𝛿, 𝐷, 𝑁 ) define one round of the protocol. If the protocol
runs 𝜌 rounds, where 2 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )) , the 𝑑-transfer attack succeeds with probability at least
0.25.
Proof. According to Theorem 6.7 the probability that an adversary successfully performs the
𝑑-transfer attack is:
𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”] > 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Now, for 𝜌 protocol runs, where 2 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )), this probability becomes:
(𝑃𝑟 [”𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡”])𝜌 > (1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )))𝜌 ≥ (1 − 1/𝜌)𝜌 > 0.25 □
Now, based on Theorem 6.8, we can create an adversary such that A wins the EXPΠQcorr with
probability at least 25% if the protocol runs fewer than exponential number of rounds with respect
to the number of voters.
Theorem 6.9. The adversary from section 6.2 wins the experiment EXPΠQcorr, where Π is the protocol
as described in section 6.1, with probability at least 0.25% for every 𝜖 > 0 and number of rounds
2 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )).
Proof. (sketch) When A calls the oracle OΠ,A on behalf of a corrupted voter 𝑉𝑘 in Casting
phase, A applies the operations as described in section 6.2 at register X𝑘 . Next, in Tally phase
C computes the election outcome. If in a round the result is different from a previous round, the
election result 𝑋 will be equal to "⊥". However, from Theorem 6.8, we know that 𝑋 ≠ ⊥ with
probability at least 0.25%, in which case the predicate Verify is always 1. □
7 QUANTUM VOTING BASED ON CONJUGATE CODING
This section looks at protocols based on conjugate coding [40, 53]. The participants in this family
of protocols are one or more election authorities, the tallier and the voters. The election authorities
are only trusted for the purpose of eligibility; privacy should be guaranteed by the protocol against
both malicious 𝐸𝐴 and𝑇 . Unlike the previous protocols, here the voters do not share any entangled
states with neither 𝐸𝐴 nor 𝑇 in order to cast their ballots. One of the main differences between the
two protocols is that [40] does not provide any verification of the election outcome, while [53] does,
but at the expense of receipt freeness, which [40] satisfies. Specifically, in [53] each 𝑉𝑘 establishes
two keys with 𝑇 in an anonymous way by using part of protocol [40] as a subroutine. It’s worth to
mention that in order for these keys to be established, further interaction between the voters and
𝐸𝐴 is required and 𝐸𝐴 is assumed trusted for that task. At the end of an execution, 𝑉𝑘 encrypts the
ballot with one of the keys and sends it to 𝑇 over a quantum anonymous channel. 𝑇 announces the
result of each ballot accompanied with the second key so that the voters can verify that their ballot
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has been counted. This makes it also possible for a coercer to verify how a voter voted, by showing
them the second key used as a receipt. It is worth mentioning that protocol [40] could easily be
made to satisfy the same notion of verifiability.
7.1 Protocol Specification
Set up phase
(1) 𝐸𝐴 picks a vector ¯𝑏 = (𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛+1) ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑛+1, where 𝑛 is the security parameter of the
protocol. This vector will be used by 𝐸𝐴 for the encoding of the ballots and it will be kept
secret from 𝑇 until the end of the ballot casting phase.




⟩ ⊗ . . . ⊗ |𝜓𝑎𝑛+1
𝑗
,𝑏𝑛+1⟩ , 𝑗 ∈ {1, . . . ,𝑤}, where 𝑎 𝑗 = (𝑎
1
𝑗 , . . . , 𝑎
𝑛+1
𝑗 ) such that:
(𝑎1𝑗 , . . . , 𝑎𝑛𝑗 ) ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑛, 𝑎𝑛+1𝑗 = 𝑎1𝑗 ⊕ . . . ⊕ 𝑎𝑛𝑗
and: |𝜓0,0⟩ = |0⟩ , |𝜓1,0⟩ = |1⟩ , |𝜓0,1⟩ = 1√
2
( |0⟩ + |1⟩), |𝜓1,1⟩ = 1√
2
( |0⟩ − |1⟩).
These𝑤 fragments will constitute a blank ballot (e.g the first row of Fig. 3 is a blank ballot
fragment).
(3) 𝐸𝐴 sends one blank ballot to each 𝑉𝑘 over an authenticated channel.
Casting phase
(4) After reception of the blank ballot, each 𝑉𝑘 re-randomizes it by picking for each fragment a
vector
¯𝑑 𝑗 = (𝑑1𝑗 , . . . , 𝑑𝑛+1𝑗 ) such that:
(𝑑1𝑗 , . . . , 𝑑𝑛𝑗 ) ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑛, 𝑑𝑛+1𝑗 = 𝑑1𝑗 ⊕ . . . ⊕ 𝑑𝑛𝑗 .




𝑑1𝑗 ⊗ . . . ⊗ 𝑌𝑑
𝑛+1
𝑗 to the blank ballot fragment






, 𝑌 0 = I
(5) 𝑉𝑘 encodes the candidate of choice in the (𝑛+1)𝑡ℎ-qubit of the last blank ballot fragments6. For
example, if we assume a referendum type election, 𝑉𝑘 votes for 𝑐 ∈ {0, 1} by applying to the
blank ballot fragment |𝜙𝑎𝑤 , ¯𝑏⟩ the unitary operations𝑈
𝑐
𝑤 respectively, where: 𝑐 = (0, . . . , 0, 𝑐)
(see Fig. 3).
(6) 𝑉𝑘 sends the ballot to 𝑇 over an anonymous channel.
Tally phase
(7) Once the ballot casting phase ends, 𝐸𝐴 announces ¯𝑏 to 𝑇 .
(8) With this knowledge,𝑇 can decode each cast ballot in the correct basis. Specifically,𝑇 decodes
each ballot fragment by measuring it in the basis described by vector
¯𝑏 and XORs the resulting
bits. After doing this to each ballot fragment, 𝑇 ends up with a string, which is the actual
vote cast.
(9) 𝑇 announces the election result.
6
Candidate choices are encoded in binary format.
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Fig. 3. The ballot consisting of𝑤 ballot fragments, which encode the binary choice “0. . . 01" in a referendum
type election example.
7.2 Vulnerabilities of Conjugate Coding Protocols
The technique underlying this protocol is closely related to the one used in the first quantum
key distribution protocols [5, 46]. However, it has some limitations in the context of these voting
schemes.
Malleable blank ballots: An adversary can change the vote of an eligible voter, when the corre-
sponding ballot is cast over the anonymous channel. Assume𝑉𝑘 has applied the appropriate unitary
on the blank ballot in order to vote for the candidate of their choice. And let us consider that the last
𝑚 ballot fragments encode the candidate. When the adversary sees the cast ballot over the quantum
anonymous channel, they apply the unitary𝑈
𝑐1
𝑤−(𝑚−1) , . . . ,𝑈
𝑐𝑚
𝑤 , where 𝑐𝑟 is either 0 or 1, depending
on their choice to flip the candidate bit or not. As a result the adversary modifies the ballot of 𝑉𝑘
such that it decodes to a different candidate than the intended one. This is possible because the
adversary is aware of the ballot fragments used to encode the candidate choice. Furthermore, if the
adversary has side channel information about the likely winning candidate (from pre-election polls
for instance), they will be able to change the vote encoded in the ballot into one of their desire. This
is possible because the adversary is aware of which bits are encoded in the ballot more frequently
and knows exactly which unitary operator to apply in order to decode to a specific candidate.
Violation of privacy: It is already acknowledged by the authors of [40] that the 𝐸𝐴 can introduce
a “serial number" in a blank ballot to identify a voter, i.e some of the blank ballot fragments in the
head of the ballot decode to “1" instead of “0". This allows the 𝐸𝐴 to decode any ballot cast over the
quantum anonymous channel, linking the identity of the voters with their choice.
One-more-unforgeability: The security of the protocol relies on a quantum problem introduced
in [40], named one-more-unforgeability and the assumption that it is computationally hard for a
quantum adversary. The game that captures this assumption goes as follows: a challenger encodes
𝑤 blank ballot fragments in a basis ¯𝑏 and gives them to the adversary. The adversary wins the game
if they produce𝑤 + 1 valid blank ballot fragments in the basis ¯𝑏. The authors claim the probability
of the adversary of winning this game is at most 1/2 + 1/2(𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙 (𝑛)).
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On the security parameter: Because of the ballots’ malleability, an adversary could substitute
the parts of the corrupted voters’ blank ballot fragments that encode a candidate, with blank ballot
fragments in a random base. Of course these ballots would open into random candidates in a specific
domain but would still be valid, since the leading zeros would not be affected by this change. This
is because blank ballots contain no entanglement. Now the adversary can keep these valid spare
blank ballot fragments to create new valid blank ballots. To address this problem, the size of blank
ballots needs to be substantially big compared to the number of voters and the size of the candidate
space (𝑁𝑚 << 𝑤 ).
8 OTHER PROTOCOLS
Other protocols have also been proposed, with main characteristic that the 𝐸𝐴 controls when
ballots get counted. This can be achieved with either the use of shared entangled states between
𝐸𝐴, 𝑇 , and 𝑉𝑘 [47, 52] or Bell pairs [47] between 𝑇 and 𝑉𝑘 with 𝐸𝐴 knowing the identity of the
holder of each pair particle. However, we do not fully analyse these protocols in this review, as
they have many and serious flaws making even the correctness arguable. The protocol of [52]
claims to provide verifiability of the election outcome, but without explaining how this can be
achieved. From our understanding of the protocol this seems unlikely to be the case. From the
description of the protocol each voter can change their mind and announce a different vote from
the originally cast one. This is possible because the function every voter uses to encode their vote is
not committed in any way. Two protocols introduced in [47] have similar limitations. For instance,
there is no mechanism for verifiability of the election outcome. In addition, privacy against𝑇 is not
satisfied in contrast to protocols we saw in section 6. This is because each voter’s vote is handled
individually and not in a homomorphic manner. All of these could be achieved just by a classical
secure channel. Last, the protocol appearing in [26] shares many of the limitations of the former
protocols as well as some further ones. The method introduced for detecting eavesdropping in the
election process is insecure, as trust is put into another voter in order to detect any deviation from
the protocol specification. Moreover, the way each voter casts their vote is not well defined in the
protocol, which makes privacy and correctness trivially violated.
Finally, we note that there exist protocols that consider elections with quantum input, see e.g.
[3]. This type of protocols is more relevant to quantum game theory and less to election schemes
with classical input/voting choice, and we have not considered them in this study.
9 DISCUSSION
In this work, we have examined the current state of the art in quantum e-voting, by presenting
the most prominent proposals and analyzing their security. What we have found is that all the
proposed protocols fail to satisfy the necessary security definitions for future implementations.
Despite this, these protocols open the way to new avenues of research, specifically on whether
quantum information can solve some long-standing issues in e-voting and cryptography in general.
By studying them, we can identify several interesting ideas for further development as well as
possible bottlenecks in future quantum protocols.
For instance, we saw that, unless combined with some new technique, the traveling ballot
protocols do not provide a viable solution, as double-voting is always possible, and there is no
straightforward way to guarantee privacy. On the other hand, the distributed ballot protocols
give us very strong privacy guarantees because of the entanglement between the ballot states, but
verifiability against malicious talliers might be hard to achieve. In fact, one of the most intriguing
questions in quantum e-voting is whether we can achieve all desired properties simultaneously.
For instance, every classical definition of verifiability [15] assumes a trusted bulletin board that
the participants can read, write on, and finally verify the outcome of the election. However,
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implementing a quantum bulletin board to achieve the same properties is not straightforward, since
reading a quantum state can ’disturb’ it in an irreversible way. For that reason we have defined in
our experiment EXPΠQVer the public quantum register B, and the predicate Verify. Of course, an
implementation of such predicate seems hard to realize in the quantum setting and more research
is needed.
We have also shown that the cut-and-choose technique used by the protocols in Section 4 is
both inefficient and insecure. A solution could be to provide some type of randomness to the
voters (e.g. in the form of a common random string), which would determine if a state should be
verified or used for the voting phase (a similar process is shown in [37, 41]). However, even if
the problem with the cut-and-choose technique is addressed, privacy can still be violated as we
have seen, and fixing this might require the use of more advanced techniques. Notwithstanding
these limitations, we believe that our analysis opens new research directions for the study of the
quantum cut-and-choose technique, which plays a fundamental role in the secure distribution of
quantum information.
The general aim of studying quantum cryptographic protocols, is to provide better guarantees
than classically possible, be that in security or efficiency. This has been achieved for primitives
like coin flipping and oblivious transfer, against unbounded adversaries [10, 42], and against
bounded ones that are more relevant to practical implementations (e.g. with limited storage [17],
noisy storage [32], or bounded by relativistic constraints [35]). The question whether quantum
technology could enhance electronic voting as well has not yet been answered, and requires further
study of both the existing classical and quantum literature. First, bottlenecks in classical election
protocols that could potentially be solved by using quantum subroutines, need to be identified.
Then, quantum protocols need to be designed, that satisfy well articulated definitions of all the
required properties in composable frameworks. In classical cryptography, this was pursued with
the help of automated provers and model checkers such as EasyCrypt [14], game based definitions
[6, 15], and by employing the Universal Composability Framework [9, 24]. However, in quantum
cryptography, it remains unclear how these techniques can be adopted. An interesting approach
appears in [23], where the authors provide an automated verification tool that enables checking
properties of systems which can be expressed within the quantum stabilizer formalism. Finally, a
recent work by Unruh [49] on quantum relational Hoare logic might open new avenues and help
provide a solution to this problem.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
In the supplementary material we include some extra technical details that due to lack of space
could not be included in the main body of the paper, as well as our response to reviews received on
previous submissions of this work.
A FORMAL DEFINITION OF QUANTUM CORRECTNESS
The correctness experiment EXPΠQcorr is the same as EXP
Π
Qver with the only exceptions that there
isn’t a predicate PΠVerify and we don’t allow A to corrupt the tallier (if there exist in the protocol Π).
As a result, we don’t capture universal verifiability in EXPΠQcorr, but only double voting and vote
deletion/alteration of honest ballots. Moreover, in the case that the election result 𝑋 is equal “⊥"
the adversary wins the experiment.
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The experiment EXPΠQcorr (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)
– Set up phase: C andA generate the parameters in registerX as specified by Π and the adversarial
model. Furthermore,A chooses the votes for all voters {𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘 ∈V and C the casting order 𝜌 ∈𝑅 F .
– Casting phase: For each 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
– If A chooses to corrupt 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) , they are added toVA .
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∉ VA , then C runs (X𝜌 (𝑘) ,⊥) ← CastBallot(𝑣𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝜌 (𝑘) , 𝛿0). If not ⊥, C calls
OΠ,A (X𝜌 (𝑘) ,X𝑅), , where 𝑅 is the receiver designated by Π.
– If 𝑉𝜌 (𝑘) ∈ VA , A performs some operation on register XA and calls OΠ,A (XA ,X𝑅), where 𝑅
is any receiver designated by A.
– Tally phase: C computes 𝑋 ← Tally(XC, 𝛿0):
– If (𝑋 = ⊥) or (PΠVCounted ({𝑣𝑘 }𝑉𝑘∉VA , 𝑋 ) = 0 ∨ Nballots
Π (𝑋 ) > 𝑁 )
then output 1, else output 0.
Definition A.1. We say that a quantum e-voting protocol Π satisfies 𝜖-quantum correctness if
for every quantum polynomial-timeA, the probability to win the experiment EXPΠQcorr (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0) is
negligible with respect to 𝛿0:
Pr[1← EXPΠQcorr (A, 𝜖, 𝛿0)] = 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑙 (𝛿0).
B PROOF OF ATTACK ON DISTRIBUTED BALLOT PROTOCOLS
Now we give detailed proofs of the theorems and lemmas of Section 6.
Lemma 6.1. Let Θ𝑣
𝐷,𝛿
∈ [0, 2𝜋] be the continuous random variable that describes the outcome of
the measurement of a vote state |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ , 𝑣 ∈ {y, n} using operators
𝐸 (\ ) = 𝐷
2𝜋
|Φ(\ )⟩ ⟨Φ(\ ) | (3)




𝑒𝑖 𝑗\ | 𝑗⟩. It holds that:






2 [𝐷 (\ − \𝑣)/2]
sin
2 [(\ − \𝑣)/2]
𝑑\ (4)
Proof.
𝑃𝑟 [𝑥𝑙 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙+𝑤] = ⟨𝜙 (\𝑣) |
∫ 𝑥𝑙+𝑤
𝑥𝑙


























sin[(\ − \𝑣) 𝑗]]2)𝑑\
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For any 𝑥 ∈ R, the following two equations hold:
𝐷−1∑︁
𝑗=0
cos[ 𝑗𝑥] = sin[𝐷𝑥/2]
sin[𝑥/2] cos[(𝐷 − 1)𝑥/2]
𝐷−1∑︁
𝑗=0
sin[ 𝑗𝑥] = sin[𝐷𝑥/2]
sin[𝑥/2] sin[(𝐷 − 1)𝑥/2]
So finally we have:






2 [𝐷 (\ − \𝑣)/2]
sin
2 [(\ − \𝑣)/2]
𝑑\
□
Lemma 6.2. Let |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ be a voting state of the protocol. Then it holds:
𝑃𝑟 [𝑥𝑙𝑣 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙𝑣+1] > 0.405
Proof. A simple change of variables in Eq.(4) gives us:







2 [𝐷 (\ − 𝛿)/2]
sin
2 [(\ − 𝛿)/2]
𝑑\
By setting (\ − 𝛿)/2 = 𝑦, we get:










The above is just a function of 𝛿 , which we denote as 𝐹 (𝛿). In order to lower-bound 𝐹 (𝛿) we














2 [(2𝜋/𝐷 − 𝛿)/2]
)
It is easy to check that:
𝑑𝐹 (𝛿)
𝑑𝛿
= 0, when 𝛿 = 0 or 𝛿 = 𝜋/𝐷
𝑑𝐹 (𝛿)
𝑑𝛿
> 0, when 0 < 𝛿 < 𝜋/𝐷
𝑑𝐹 (𝛿)
𝑑𝛿
< 0, when 𝜋/𝐷 < 𝛿 < 2𝜋/𝐷
It also holds that 𝐹 (0) = 𝐹 (2𝜋/𝐷), so the minimum extreme points of our function are equal. As a
result we have:
𝐹 (𝛿) ≥ lim
𝛿→0−
𝐹 (𝛿) = 𝐹 (0) (5)
From the fact that:
| sin[𝑥] | ≤ |𝑥 |,∀𝑥 ∈ R
| sin[𝑥] | ≥ |(2/𝜋)𝑥 |,∀𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝜋/2]
| sin[𝑥] | ≥ | − (2/𝜋)𝑥 + 2|,∀𝑥 ∈ [𝜋/2, 𝜋]
ACM Trans. Quantum Comput., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
Definitions and Security of Quantum Electronic Voting 111:29
It follows:

























Now in order to prove lemma 6.3, we need the following proposition:














(2𝑛)! , ∀𝑥 ∈ R
Then:
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If we think of the above as a sum of terms 𝑎𝑛 (𝑛 = 21, . . . ,∞), for integer 𝑗 ≥ 10, it holds that:
𝑎𝑛 > 0, when 𝑛 = 2 𝑗 + 1,
𝑎𝑛 < 0, when 𝑛 = 2 𝑗 .
We therefore need to prove that
∞∑
𝑛=21
𝑎𝑛 > 0, which in turn is equivalent to proving that:
|𝑎𝑛 | > |𝑎𝑛+1 | ⇐⇒ 22𝑛−1𝑥2𝑛/(2𝑛)! > 22𝑛+1𝑥2𝑛+2/(2𝑛 + 2)!
⇐⇒ 1 > 4𝑥2/((2𝑛 + 1) (2𝑛 + 2))
⇐⇒ (2𝑛 + 1) (2𝑛 + 2)/4 > 𝑥2
In this case, the above holds, because the minimum value of n is 21 and the maximum value of 𝑥2 is
4𝜋2. □
Lemma 6.3. Let |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ be a voting state of the protocol. Then it holds:
𝑃𝑟 [𝑥𝑙𝑣−1 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙𝑣+2] > 0.9
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Proof. We follow exactly the same procedure as lemma 6.2 and get:







2 [𝐷 (\ − \𝑣)/2]
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2 [𝐷 (\ − 𝛿)/2]
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where (\ − 𝛿)/2 = 𝑦. Again the above probability depends only on 𝛿 and can therefore be denoted
with 𝐹 (𝛿). In a similar way as before, we can prove that the minimum of this function is at 𝛿 = 0
and compute 𝐹 (0).



























































Theorem 6.4. With overwhelming probability in the number of voters 𝑁 , algorithm 1 includes 𝑙𝑣
in the Solution vector (i.e. it measures a value in the interval [𝑥𝑙𝑣 , 𝑥𝑙𝑣+1] more than 40% of the time).
Pr[Solution[0] = 𝑙𝑣 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑙𝑣] > 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Proof. We can see each measurement that algorithm 1 performs at each vote state |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩, as
an independent Bernoulli trial 𝑋𝑙 with probability of success 𝑝𝑙 = Pr[𝑥𝑙 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝑙+1]. Then the
value of Record[𝑙] follows the binomial distribution:
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We can therefore compute:
Pr
[




Record[𝑙𝑣] ≥ 0.4Y𝑁 /2
]
≥ 1 − Pr
[
Record[𝑙𝑣] ≤ 0.4Y𝑁 /2
]
1
= 1 − Pr
[
Record[𝑙𝑣] ≤ (1 − 𝛾)𝑝𝑙𝑣Y𝑁 /2
]
2
≥ 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾2𝑝𝑙𝑣Y𝑁 /6)
= 1 − (𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾2𝑝𝑙𝑣Y/6))𝑁
= 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )) □
Theorem 6.5. With negligible probability in the number of voters 𝑁 , algorithm 1 includes a value
other than (𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1) in the Solution vector, i.e. ∀𝑤 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝑙𝑣 − 2, 𝑙𝑣 + 2, . . . , 𝐷 − 1}:
𝑃𝑟 [Solution[0] = 𝑤 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑤] < 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Proof. Let𝑤 ∈ {0, . . . , 𝐷 − 1} \ {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1}, then it holds:
𝑃𝑟 [Solution[0] = 𝑤 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑤]
= 𝑃𝑟 [𝑋Record[𝑤 ] ≥ 0.4Y𝑁 /2]
We know from lemma 6.3 that 𝑝𝑤 < 0.1, so ∃𝛾 > 0 such that:7
𝑃𝑟 [𝑋Record[𝑤 ] ≥ 0.4Y𝑁 /2]
= 𝑃𝑟 [𝑋Record[𝑤 ] ≥ (1 + 𝛾)𝑝𝑤Y𝑁 /2]
< 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾𝑝𝑤Y𝑁 /6)
= (𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾𝑝𝑤Y/6))𝑁
= 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )) □
Lemma 6.6. With overwhelming probability in 𝑁 , the Solution vector in algorithm 1, is equal to
[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, “𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”] or [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]. Specifically,
Pr[Solution ∈ {[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, “𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”], [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]}]
> 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 ))
Proof. Let as define the following events:
𝐴 =
[
Solution[0] = 𝑤 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑤,




Solution[0] = 𝑙𝑣 ∨ Solution[1] = 𝑙𝑣
]
1𝑝𝑙𝑣 > 0.405 =⇒ ∃𝛾 > 0 s.t 0.4 = (1 − 𝛾 )𝑝𝑙𝑣
2
The Chernoff bound for a random variable 𝑋 ∼ 𝐵 (𝑁, 𝑝) and expected value 𝐸 [𝑋 ] = ` is: 𝑃𝑟 [𝑋 ≤ (1 − 𝛾 )` ] ≤
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾2`/3)
7
The Chernoff bound for a random variable 𝑋 ∼ 𝐵 (𝑁, 𝑝) and expected value 𝐸 [𝑋 ] = ` is: 𝑃𝑟 [𝑋 ≤ (1 + 𝛾 )` ] ≤
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾`/3), 𝛾 > 1
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Since the cases Solution = [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1] and Solution = [𝑙𝑣 + 1, 𝑙𝑣] are impossible from the
construction of the algorithm, from theorems 6.4 and 6.5 it holds:
Pr[Solution ∈ {[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, “𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙”], [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]}]
= Pr[𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐴]
= Pr[𝐵] − Pr[𝐵 ∧𝐴]
> 1 − 1/𝑒𝑥𝑝 (Ω(𝑁 )) □
Lemma B.2. Let |𝜓 (\𝑣)⟩ be a voting state with 𝛿 ∈ [0, 2𝜋/𝐷) and 𝑙𝑣 = 𝐷 −1,where 𝛿 is a continuous
random variable .Then it holds:
Pr[𝑥𝐷−2 < Θ𝑣𝐷,𝛿 < 𝑥𝐷 ] + 𝑃𝑟 [𝑥0 < Θ
𝑣
𝐷,𝛿
< 𝑥1] > 0.9
Proof.







Now we set \ = \ − 𝑥𝐷 to 11 and we have:




(𝑆𝑖𝑛[−𝐷𝜋 + 𝐷/2(\ − \𝑣)]























𝑆𝑖𝑛2 [𝐷 (\ − 𝛿)/2]
𝑆𝑖𝑛2 [(\ − 𝛿)/2] 𝑑\ (17)
From lemma 6.3 this integral is at least 0.9. The proof is similar for 𝑙𝑣 = 0. □
Lemma B.3. Let Solution be the matrix of algorithm 1, then it holds:
Pr[Solution ∈ {{𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}, {𝑙𝑣}, {𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1}}]
= Pr[Solution ∈ {[𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣], [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1]}]
Proof. (sketch)It holds that:
Pr[Solution ∈ {{𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}, {𝑙𝑣}, {𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1}}] (18)
= Pr[Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}] (19)
+ Pr[Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣}] (20)
+ Pr[Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 + 1}] (21)
We need to prove that:
Pr[Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}] = Pr[Solution = [𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣]] (22)
ACM Trans. Quantum Comput., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
Definitions and Security of Quantum Electronic Voting 111:33
From the construction of the algorithm 1 we know that:
Pr[Solution = [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1] |Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}] = 0 (23)
This is true because the values of the Solution are from the matrix Record in a progressive manner.
So under the assumption that both 𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1 had appeared at least 40% times, they inserted in a
progressive order. The only time they will not is the case in which 𝑙𝑣 = 0 and 𝑙𝑣 − 1 = 𝐷 − 1. At
first the order is [0, 𝐷 − 1], but because of the special condition we had in our algorithm the order
switches to [𝐷 − 1, 0].
It holds that:
Pr[Solution = [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1] |Solution ∈ {𝑙𝑣 − 1, 𝑙𝑣}] (24)
= Pr[Solution = [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1]] + Pr[∅] (25)
= Pr[Solution = [𝑙𝑣, 𝑙𝑣 − 1]] (26)
= 0 (27)
Similar are the other cases. □
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